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Introduction 
In the past years, gender relations in water management in Nepal have increasingly 
captured the attention of academic and policy oriented circles. Though only few 
empirical studies have been made: so far,2 the interest is growing and Nepali NGOs 
and IWMI have initiated new research (Merrey 1997). The concerns are the same as 
those that have led to attention to gender and rights issues in agriculture in other 
countries.3 First, and in the most general way, it is a reaction against research and 
policy making that leaves about half of the population unaccounted for. In Nepal, 
which depends for 90 percent of its GNP on agriculture, women play a major role in 
agricultural production. Acharya and Bennett estimate that 57 percent of adult input 
time into subsistence agriculture and related activities come from women, who 
contribute half the household income (Seddon 1987: 193). Participation of women in 
irrigation varies, but sometimes reaches as much as 50 percent of irrigation activities. 
Yet, until recently, their involvement remained largely unnoticed. Secondly, there is 
the socio-political and moral concern with the fundamental imbalance which 
characterizes gender relationships in Nepal ideologically, legally and in social practices. 
In the dominant Hindu religion, women are assigned social and economic positions 
This contribution is largely based on the paper "Gender, law and rights to land and water" which 
we presented at the Kathmandu Workshop in March 1998 and on a paper which we presented at 
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that are principally subordinate to those of men.4 Decision making processes, within 
and outside the household, are usually dominated by men. Women have less right to 
productive resources than men; the rights women have are mostly weaker than those 
held by men; and these weaker rights are largely derived from the stronger rights held 
by men or social units dominated by men. And generally, even the rights women have 
often cannot be asserted in social and economic life. Thirdly, studies of gender relations 
in irrigated agriculture and of intervention practices are critical not just on account of 
the inequitable consequences for gender relationships. They also emphasize in a more 
instrumentalist way the importance of more equal gender relations for the improvement 
of the general welfare of the rural population, as well as for a more efficient use of 
water (Agarwal 1994). Interventions in irrigated agriculture tended to be, and still are 
heavily informed by technological and economic considerations. In as far as local 
social and economic organisation is taken into account at all, irrigation is predominantly 
seen as a 'male domain' and men are seen as the main addressees by external agencies. 
The considerable role women play in irrigating as well as their lesser, derived rights 
to water remained largely unrecognised. As a consequence, gender specific needs for 
water tended to remain unexamined. The awareness of existing inequalities and their 
social and economic consequences has intensified with the increase of state or donor 
initiated actions to improve agricultural production through the construction of new 
irrigation schemes or the expansion and rehabilitation of existing systems. The concern 
for differential impact on gender relations has now joined the earlier, but gender-
insensitive attention given to differential impacts of intervention in terms of people's 
social and economic power.5 
In the discussions about the position of women in irrigated agriculture in Nepal and in 
the remedies suggested for change, the issue of property rights in general, and water 
rights in particular, plays a very central role. The non-existing or weak water rights of 
women have been held to contribute significantly to their weak social and economic 
position, and it has been advocated that their position should be changed by giving 
them independent rights to water.6 Although the recent literature on gender, property 
and water rights has generated important new empirical material and theoretical 
insights, we think that there is a need for further refinement. 
First of all, most authors writing about 'rights' do not distinguish between 
'categorical' and 'concretised' rights. Categorical rights define in general terms the 
legal status of categories of persons and property objects as well as the type of rights 
and obligations between persons with respect to property objects. An example would 
be that "heirs of land within the command area of an irrigation system are entitled to 
inherit the right to water in the irrigation system". We speak of concretised rights 
Hindu religion is the official religion of the Nepali kingdom. For its significance in social and 
political life, see Burghart 1984, Gray 1995, Gellner et al. 1997. 
See U. Pradhan 1990, Chambers 1994, Zwarteveen 1997, Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997, van Koppen 
1998, Merrey and Baviskar 1998. 
Agarwal 1994, Zwarteveen 1997, van Koppen 1998a. 
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when the legal criteria of a categorical right are inscribed and become embodied in a 
social relationship between actual persons with respect to actual property objects. An 
example would be the statement that "landowner A has a right to a turn in the rotation 
scheme in irrigation system X". The social processes through which categorical rights 
and concretised rights are established, the ways in which categorical rights are 
transformed into concretised rights, and through which both categorical and concretised 
rights are effectuated are quite different.7 Second, there is often too little attention to 
the range of rights and obligations that are considered 'water rights', both categorical 
and concretised. The term water rights is sometimes used for the distribution and 
allocation only, while others regard all rights and obligations related to water as water 
rights." Analytical umbrella concepts such as access and control and the bundle of 
rights metaphor need further differentiation of the aspects or types of legitimate action 
that are bundled in (empirical) categorical and concretised rights.9 We suggest that it 
is useful to consider the full scope of aspects of rights and obligations that cover 
socio-political control and uses of water, both in the private and public sphere, and at 
individual and communal levels. Thus full member of a water user association or the 
state appointed controller of water distribution in the branch canal have a water right 
just as a land owner or a share-cropper, the difference lying in the scope and kind of 
legitimate action each of these rights conveys, and the scope and kind of obligations 
attached to them. Third, there is a tendency to treat rights to water as a distinct set of 
property rights. While the connection between land rights and water rights is 
increasingly noted (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997), we think that the complexities of these 
interrelationships deserve further exploration. Fourth, too little attention is given to 
conditions of legal pluralism where rules and principles of different origin and 
legitimation co-exist in the same locality.1" The content of categorical rights, the ways 
in which they are bundled, the holders of such rights and the connection of land and 
For an elaboration of this distinction, see F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994, F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1995. Compare Schlager and Ostrom (1992) who fail to make this distinction. In their 
words, the term "rights" refers to particular actions that are authorized, while the term "rules" 
refer to the prescriptions that create authorizations (1992: 250). While this conceptual clarification 
is useful, it should be noted that they talk about categorical rights only. They do not address the 
crucial significance of the social processes through which categorical rights have to be transformed 
into concretised rights. However, much of the gender inequality is precisely a result of this process 
of transformation. 
In the political debate about whether women should have rights to water, the term water right 
often seems to be preserved for the allocation or'distribution, or a share of water only. For example, 
van Koppen (1998a: 141) states "[i]nclusion in forums or water users' associations is a 'proxy' 
for being vested with resource rights." She regards membership of a water users association as 
"recognition of water rights", not as an element of the water right itself. 
See for further differentiation of the bundle of rights Wiber 1991, Schlager and Ostrom 1992, K. 
von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1997; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1996, F. von Benda-Beckmann, 
K. von Benda-Beckmann, Spiertz 1997. 
1
 For a discussion of legal pluralism with respect to water rights, see F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 
1997. The distinction made between de facto and de jure rights which is made in resource 
management studies (Schlager and Ostrom 1992) also expresses awareness of plural legal 
conditions. 
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water rights are often defined differently in different legal systems. At the local level, 
the dominant constructions of categorical rights often are hybrid legal forms consisting 
of elements taken from state legislation and older or more recent local traditions ('local 
law')- The elements of these hybrid forms are inscribed in the concretised rights, for 
relations of legitimate authority and socio-political decision making as well as for 
legitimate forms of appropriation and use. This is particularly relevant for the final 
point we want to make. Studies of gender in irrigated agriculture have a tendency to 
focus too exclusively on gender as the most important social differential, not relating 
it to other social differentials such as caste and class. Constructions of gender categories 
and relations certainly are all-pervasive." They are expressed in general cultural and 
religious ideas about the appropriate nature, status, rights and obligations of the genders. 
They are also defined into the categorical normative frameworks of institutions and 
organizations. Such definitions of rights and obligations may differ from the more 
general cultural-religious or ideological gender constructions. They are usually also 
different in state and local laws, and there are considerable differences between local 
laws as well. Moreover, gender constructions of rights are often different for categorical 
and concretised rights. While categorical rights can be defined as gender-neutral, all 
actual social relationships and concretised rights and obligations are gendered. But 
while gender relations are one of the most "enduring inequalities" (Tilly 1998), they 
are not the only one. The political-economy of Nepal is characterized by a profoundly 
unequal distribution of economic and political power, and a fundamentally in egalitarian 
socio-religious ideology and social practice (Seddon 1987: x, xi). Land ownership is 
highly skewed. Social, economic and political life, especially in the Hinduized areas, 
is largely organized along caste (jat)12 differences that shape any individual's legal 
status and permeate all social relationships, and local categorical and concretised 
rights in particular.13 Moreover, social differentials based on common kinship, class 
or caste, or occupation form the basis for the formation of social and economic groups 
in which gender, as a category is only secondary. This means that the relation between 
the factors gender, class and caste needs to be explored. 
In this contribution we want to draw attention to what we call the 'multiple 
contingencies of water rights'.14 With this we refer to the condition that water rights 
are contingent upon a variety of legal and nôn-legal elements, on land rights, family 
11
 Gender refers to "socially learned behaviours and expectations that are associated with members 
of a biological sex category" (Andersen 1988: 48). 
12
 The term jat refers to both caste and ethnic group. The Hinduized ethnic groups have been 
incorporated into the caste system. In this paper we use the translation caste, but it should be kept 
in mind that this may include references to ethnic groups. 
" Gray (1995: 7). On the historical development and contemporary caste differences, see Burghart 
1984, Seddon 1987, Gray 1995, Sharma 1997. See also the contributions of Pradhan and Poudel 
in this volume. 
14
 We confine our discussion to irrigation systems that derive their water from rivers and which are 
farmers' managed. This is by far the majority of irrigation systems in Nepal. Privately owned 
springs, very small, privately owned systems that derive their water directly from a small stream 
as well as groundwater systems will not be dealt with here. Neither will we discuss government 
managed systems. 
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relationships, political organization and ecological conditions. We want to show that 
apart from discrimination at the level of categorical rights, these contingencies make 
it particularly difficult for women to actually acquire rights which they could hold 
under the current legal regime, or to maintain those rights after acquisition. 
Furthermore, we shall also show how these factors affect women differently depending 
on their caste and their social, economic status. 
Before turning to gender differences in the structure of categorical and concrete 
rights to water and to the processes in which categorical rights and concretised rights 
can be effectuated, we shall discuss the general contingencies that condition water 
rights in Nepal: the connection between water rights and land rights, the specific 
combination of land-based water rights and socio-political specification, and the 
additional conditions for maintaining rights. We shall then show how characteristic 
features of Nepal's political, economic and geomorphic conditions lead to a highly 
dynamic and flexible relation between rights to appropriate and use water, land rights 
and socio-political decision making. Thereafter we shall go into the gendered nature 
of land and water rights and show how the multiple contingencies of water rights 
place women in a particularly difficult position in acquiring and effectuating water 
rights. By way of conclusion we shall argue why we do not fully share the idea that 
"the biggest impediment [our italics] to establishing legitimacy for women's need for 
individual water rights is the astounding lack of recognition of women as irrigators 
and water users" (Zwarteveen 1997: 1346). While we agree that there is a formidable 
problem there, we suggest that greater difficulties for changing gender relations in 
irrigated agriculture in Nepal lie in the connections between land and water rights, 
and in the way in which these form part of a wider set of socio-legal relationships. 
The contingencies and dynamics of water rights in irrigation 
systems 
The relations between land and water rights 
Rights to water are rarely rights that isolate water as an object of rights completely 
from rights to the land on, under, or adjacent to which water is located (F. von Benda-
Beckmann et al. 1997: 224). Often, in the case of groundwater and water in wells, 
rights to water are directly tied to rights in land. In irrigation, rights to water are often 
derived from rights to land. Under the present legal regime,15 unless the state 
government has taken over an irrigation system, the major general rules and principles 
embodied in the Muluki Ain and local laws are: Landowners participating by their 
own labour or expenses in building a canal obtain inheritable priority rights over the 
water in the canal. The labour input of tenants is usually ascribed to the landowners. 
One may not control more water than one can use for one's own purposes. Surplus 
water must be shared with minor rights holders or even outsiders. First users have 
priority over newcomers. Migrants need the consent of original settlers to build a 
15
 See Khadka 1977, Pradhan in this volume. 
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canal, and fields irrigated of old (sabik) have prior rights to water over all others. 
Finally, full rights in an irrigation system involve certain obligations: To retain one's 
right to water, one must contribute to the maintenance of the system. Full rights imply 
a right to a share of water both in monsoon and in dry season irrigation. 
In Nepal, local rights to share in the water of an irrigation system thus are attached 
to the rights to fields in the command area. These fields are owned by individual or 
joint owners who live together with non-owners in households. Water rights may be 
further specified with respect to types of fields and crops. Title-holders to irrigated 
fields (khet) or dry upland fields (bari, bhit) may be entitled to different water shares. 
It is as a holder of rights to land that person, male or female, households or larger 
communities are in the position to claim and appropriate water for irrigating their 
fields. Rights to water are almost always transferred with the right to land, whether by 
purchase, gift or inheritance.16 
But while there usually is a close connection between water and the land on or 
adjacent to which it flows, water rights have a different character than those to land 
due to the physical-natural characteristics of water. Water is a fugitive resource and 
exists in a transitory state. Because of its fluidity, the same source of water is generally 
used by more than one user. Because of its fluidity water rights cannot be 'fixed' in 
time and space as easily as rights to land. In contrast to rights to land which can be 
defined with respect to a clearly demarcated part of the environment, water rights are 
nearly always defined as relational with respect to other users (Hammoudi 1984). The 
distribution is structured by various technical devices such as canals, diversion heads, 
weirs, etc. and by a variety of distribution principles, e.g., first come-first serve, rotation 
schemes or volumetric calculation. The actual amount of water to which a concretised 
right pertains is 'fixed' through the natural flow of water and social processes of 
allocation, distribution and appropriation. These processes occur at different levels of 
an irrigation system; from the division of water between systems drawing water 
from the same river, the distribution between main and branch canals down to the 
distribution over field inlets. While the flow of water is a more or less permanent 
process, this specification or 'fixing' of the substantive quantity of water rights has to 
be done or maintained every day, and may vary with and during day and night time 
and over the seasons. 
The actual connection between land and water rights thus is highly variable. It 
varies in particular with the kind of distribution adopted. A distinction must be made 
between water abundance and water scarcity. In water abundant areas during the 
monsoon, water flows continuously and right holders may tap freely. Abundance and 
scarcity, however, to a large extent depend on the crops that are under cultivation. 
This means that, though there is more water during monsoon than during the winter 
season, during monsoon water may be scarcer, so that only rice fields {khet land) may 
be irrigated, whereas during the winter season owners of unlevelled land (khetlpakho 
Sodemba and Pradhan in this volume report one dispute in the Ham region in which a landowner 
claimed to have sold a plot of land without water rights, a claim vehemently contested by the 
buyer. 
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or bhit) are often entitled to irrigation water as well. If there is not enough water, a 
distribution system has to be developed at the different levels of the irrigation system. 
This usually is based on rotational use, often a combination of several rotational 
principles, each adjusted to a particular phase in the cropping cycle. There is 
considerable variation in the basis upon which rotation takes place in terms of duration, 
volume and order. At the level of individual fields, the share of water is generally 
related to the size of the fields, but there are cases in which the quality of the soil, as 
well as the kind of crops is also taken into account.17 The order of water application 
may start with the head-reachers or with the tail-enders. Which option is chosen is not 
unimportant, for generally speaking it is of advantage to be among the first to receive 
water in a rotational system. The volume that goes into branch canals may depend on 
the total area that is to be served by the branches, or on the labour and financial input 
in the maintenance of the main canal. But it also may be shared in equal shares, 
independent from the size of the land in the respective command area. Or it may be 
determined by the relative socio-political strength of individuals or groups within the 
system (Shukla et al. 1997). 
Socio-political control 
Due to the characteristics of irrigation systems and the water flowing in them, water, 
more readily than land, is perceived and legally treated as a common good over which 
socio-political organizations such as the state or villages claim the right to regulate 
and distribute it.ls In farmer managed irrigation systems, socio-political control over 
water is bound into a wider network of supra-household organization, consisting of 
influential local leaders, former jitnidars or Water User Associations. The distribution 
of water may also be controlled by specially appointed functionaries (panipale), who 
receive compensation for their work, organizing water distribution and monitoring 
rotation schemes.19 Individual rights remain contingent on socio-political decision 
making and therefore rarely reach the level of economic power in ownership type of 
rights (see Zwarteveen 1997: 1339). 
Maintenance of water rights 
Maintaining water rights over time is further conditional on the landowners' or land 
users' contribution to repair and maintenance of the irrigation system. Every year the 
canals have to be cleaned and repaired before the irrigation season starts. If there are 
17
 Over time an irrigation system may change its rotation principles several times. Durga K.C. and 
R. Pradhan (1997) report that a system in Tanahu district started out with a water distribution 
system for monsoon rice in which a period of continuous irrigation was followed by two different 
rotation systems. With the introduction of a new rice variety they turned to a three stage rotational 
system for monsoon rice. See also Van der Schaaf in this volume. 
18
 For the legal history of state legal regulation on land and water, see R. Pradhan in this volume. See 
also Regmi 1971, Benjamin 1994, Khadka 1997, Shivakoti et al. 1997. 
19
 Over time, systems may employ different operators and controlling officers (e.g., Durga K.C. and 
R. Pradhan 1997). It may be done by a professional operator who is appointed and paid by the 
users. In many cases officials from among the users are appointed to do the work. 
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no permanent diversion works, these have to be rebuilt every year. But semi-permanent 
or permanent head works are also frequently destroyed due to heavy monsoon floods 
and landslides. These labour obligations to contribute to the maintenance of the system 
are divided over households as constituent units of the local socio-political organization. 
The calculation of their obligations can be based on the size of the land they posses 
but it may also be based on the number of persons or households in the respective 
areas (see Shukla et al. 1997). However, only (members of) households holding land 
in the command area may take part in maintenance and operation activities. The same 
goes for tenants or sharecroppers: their rights to water are derived from the landowner's 
rights to the land. 
These factors make the interrelation between land and water rights in irrigation systems 
quite complex. The rights to appropriate water are tied to land rights, but the actual 
specification or 'fixing' of water rights in terms of volume or time share is also 
dissociated from the land through processes of socio-political decision making over 
water as an object of communal rights and processes of appropriation. The right to 
the water which has been appropriated, on the other hand, is very similar to a normal 
private property right. Ostrom's distinction between "resource systems" or "stocks" 
and "resource units", what individuals appropriate and use from resource systems 
(1990: 31), is helpful but needs further elaboration. For what is "common" or shared 
property in the resource system, i.e., the water in the irrigation system, and what is a 
resource unit, i.e., the water appropriated (Ostrom 1990: 30), is relative to the structure 
of the irrigation system and the socio-political organization of decision making (see 
also Wiber 1991). Water in the fields is the resource unit in relation to the resource 
stock, the water in the irrigation branch canal. But in relation to the resource stock in 
the main canal, the water in the branch canal can also be seen as a resource unit 
appropriated by the right holders in the branch canal service area. And in relation to 
the river feeding several irrigation systems, the water in the main canal may be seen 
as a resource unit, appropriated by the community of the canal command area. 
The dynamics of water rights in Nepal 
We have sketched the conditions that require repeated specification of what water 
rights mean in a specific social and ecological context. The criteria for this specification 
largely have the character of principles rather than of rules. Negotiations and fights 
over rearrangements of water allocation and in the agreements and settlements that 
are reached reflect which of the principles are followed and in which hierarchy. Apart 
from the seasonal variation in water rights, there are additional factors that necessitate 
repeated readjustments and renegotiations in which water rights are concretised, both 
with respect to the allocation, i.e., the official, valid assignment of rights to water 
shares, as well as to the actual distribution of water over social units and irrigation 
sjstems (see Shukla et al. 1997, K. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1997). A number of 
factors give the water rights system in Nepal a particular dynamism. 
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One h socio-economic. Irrigation development in Nepal in many areas, particularly 
in the Terai, has all the characteristics of a frontier. This process which started with 
the land reclamation schemes centuries ago has not stopped yet.2" Migration and 
normal population growth demand the expansion of irrigable land. This sets one of 
the preconditions for the continuous flux in irrigation arrangements and the constant 
renegotiations of water rights.21 In the more recent years characterized by increased 
intervention from the Department of Irrigation and donor projects, government 
sponsored rehabilitation of irrigation projects has combined with or even taken the 
place of purely local activities. In existing farmers' managed systems that are 
rehabilitated, clarification of water rights is also necessary because rehabilitation always 
entails principles based on local law and on the law of the state or donor agencies 
which come to interact in the rehabilitation process. These rights may be mutually 
exclusive, although this is not necessarily the case. Though agencies designing and 
implementing the rehabilitation may wish differently, it is not certain from the outset 
which set of rules and principles takes priority over the other. This is a frequent problem 
because intervention agencies are rarely aware of existing local regulations, let alone 
willing to build upon them for the renewed and enlarged irrigation system. Instead, 
new rules are usually designed as if there were no prior rules in place before 
rehabilitation. The new rules enable those 'setting the stakes' to play out the state 
water right authority and ideas about 'beneficiaries' against their opponents' claims 
based upon the existing structure of water rights. In these struggles over the 
concrétisation of water rights, each set of rules provides a repertoire of accepted 
justifications and options for possible arrangements, but none of them leads 
unequivocally to one particular solution.22 
Second, changing political and administrative relationships between villages, 
irrigation farmers, and especially local leaders contribute further to the frequent 
attempts to rearrange water rights. Such conflicts tend to be embedded in political 
rivalry among dominant families who have all allied themselves with various political 
parties. This political dynamism has a long tradition in Nepal. Under the Rana regime, 
when relations of political and economic patronage were still relatively simple and 
undifferentiated, positions of governmental and economic authority were highly 
unstable. Officials, district governors, tax collectors, especially at intermediate levels, 
were appointed and dismissed quite frequently (see Caplan 1975). The regularity 
with which regional and local power relations changed has continued under the new 
administrative regime. This process has provided a set of differentiated positions of 
administrative and economic power over resources in different governmental 
departments and district and village councils, which overlap with the more traditional 
powers of former jimidar and other traditional leaders, many of whom managed to 
combine, or exchange, their traditional authority with the authority of the state 
20
 See the cases described by R. Pradhan, Haq and U. Pradhan ( 1997) and Durga K.C and R. Pradhan 
(1997) which illustrate the gradual expansion of irrigation systems and the constant renegotiations 
between old water users and new claimants. 
21
 See also the case from Ham District described by Bajracharya in this volume. 
22
 This provides many opportunities for forum shopping and shopping forums (K. von Benda-
Beckmann 1981). See the case studies in R. Pradhan et al. 1997 and Khadka in this volume. 
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administration or political parties. Moreover, Nepali party politics are highly volatile, 
new coalitions coming into power nearly each half year. Any change in local power 
relations thus is seen as a good reason to question previous water rights arrangements, 
as an attempt to finally implement earlier agreements, or to force new agreements that 
are more favourable to one's own irrigation system. This is further complicated by the 
fact that often the traditional political-economic jurisdictions were largely based on 
land grants and the irrigation system was an integral part of such area. In the newly 
developed system of territorial-administrative relations, however, administrative 
boundaries and property or irrigation boundaries are rarely congruent. Rivers and 
streams are the axis of irrigation systems, but often form the natural boundary between 
villages, areas under one socio-political control. Problems about the location of intakes 
for irrigation systems, questions of whether and where new intakes could be 
constructed, thus regularly lead to conflicts between socio-political communities.23 
Finally, there are geomorphic reasons that necessitate regular rearrangements of 
the irrigation infrastructure and water rights, such as the frequent occurrence of floods, 
changes in the flow regime of the streams, and changes in the diversion infrastructure.24 
This requires new negotiations over intakes, the relocation of main canals and often 
even secondary channels, and water distribution within canals. 
Given this need for frequent renegotiation of specific water rights, it becomes 
crucial for individual water users to be able to participate in such negotiations. As we 
shall see, women usually are excluded from the forums in which these negotiations 
take place and decisions are made. 
Gendered rights to land and water in irrigation systems 
Against the background of the specific Nepalese general structure of water rights we 
shall now retrace our earlier steps and look at the ways in which gender enters the 
structure of land and water rights, socio-political control and the concrétisation and 
effectuation of water rights. 
Gender and the land-water right connection 
In terms of categorical rights, both men and women can be holders of the fullest 
rights to agricultural land. Ownership titles can in principle be registered in a woman's 
name. While women can purchase land and be a recipient of a gift which transfers 
land rights,25 they are, however, limited in their rights to inherit land, according to 
21
 An extremely interesting example of these historically shifting boundaries of irrigation units and 
socio-political jurisdictions over water allocation is provided by Adhikari and R. Pradhan in this 
volume. See also Khadka in this volume. 
24
 See Shukla et al. 1997, K. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1997: 1-57. 
25
 This is mainly the case for raikar land which is not subject to the limitations of inherited property. 
In Terai communities women sometime buy land from their dowry. They become full owners, but 
upon their death it is inherited by sons, not by a daughter. Prabina Bajracharya and Amita Tuladhar, 
who have come across examples in West Gandak during their IWMI research on gender, poverty 
and water in Nepal (personal communication). 
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both state and local law. But apart from the discriminatory regulation of inheritance, 
women's abilities to acquire independent concretised rights to land, and consequently 
to irrigation water, are limited for other reasons. This has to do with the way in which 
social organization, kinship and marriage, and property relationships are interwoven. 
The core units holding agricultural property, at least in the Hinduized regions are 
patrilineal segments (santan) comprising two or three generations, around which 
households (pariwar) are formed.26 Women belong to their father's patrilineage until 
they marry. Upon marriage they become a member of their husband's patrilineage. By 
marrying his wife, the husband fulfils his dharma (Gray 1995: 49). Accordingly, 
wives are subordinated to their husbands. Land is the source of origin, reproduction 
and unity of the patrilineage. The patrilineage relates to land as a collective - within it 
respect (inannu parne) provides the discursive idiom in which gradations of control 
of the land (and power) are practised (Gray 1995: 147). It is the patrilineage of men 
who havesuperior rights of control over land (Gray 1995: 50). The formation and 
division of households is intimately linked with the property relationships and 
inheritance to land. Inheritance is patrilineal. Most land is acquired through one's 
fathef by inheritance. Through their birth, sons become right holders in their father's 
property, or rather, the property of their father's santan. Even if the land should be 
,registered only in the name of the father, father and sons become co-parcerners in the 
joint estate.27 After marriage, and especially after sons get children, the joint property 
can be partitioned. With the partitioning of the land, the joint family is partitioned as 
well, and the sons start to build and run their own household. Often a more informal 
separation of a son's family from his father's house precedes the official partitioning 
of the household and the joint property. Tensions between brothers, and after marriage, 
between their families, over the use and distribution of benefits of the land are frequent. 
Partitioning is seen as reflecting the tensions and struggles between the emergent new 
families, as a denial of the collective spirit and the authority of the father. It is therefore 
often deferred until after the father's death. 
Women, as daughters, only have inheritance rights in land if they remain unmarried 
until the age of 35. This is an extremely rare occurrence.2" Their rights to household 
property are seen as being compensated by the dowry they get upon marriage. Should 
they return to their natal household - most marriages are virilocal - they only have a 
right to maintenance from their patrilineage's land. When they marry, they acquire a 
26
 See Gray 1995. Especially in the Hinduized population, households are of central importance in 
everyday life as the cultural, social and economic unit. It is through being a member in a household 
that Nepali men and women perceive and experience social life within and outside the domestic 
sphere. As Gray says, for Hindus, everyday life is domestic life (Gray 1995: 26). 
27
 Inheritance refers to the whole process of inter-generational transfer of property. While in some 
legal systems this transfer occurs typically upon the death of an inheritor, in Nepal transfer starts 
at the birth of a son, when they become co-parcener. They are entitled to request partitioning of 
family property during the lifetime of their father. Becoming co-parcener upon birth and partitioning 
are part of a long process of inter-generational transfer of family property and are therefore regarded 
as part of the wider concept inheritance. 
28
 See Gray 1995: 145. And even then, should a woman marry at later stage, she will loose her right 
to the inherited property. 
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right to be maintained, but do not get independent rights to land of their husband's 
family. They work on the land of their husband, or of their husband's family in case 
partition has not taken place yet. If a man dies without leaving sons, the widow officially 
inherits his property, or his share in the joint property if partition has not yet taken 
place. Legally, such land can be registered in her name. If widows remarry, they have 
to return such property to their husband's lineage. However, widows of high castes 
are not allowed to remarry. 
Registration of land in a wife's name is a rare occurrence, especially in the case of 
family land, and is usually strongly opposed by her husband's family, who are afraid 
that the land could eventually be inherited by her daughters or be transferred by her as 
a gift to someone outside the husband's lineage.29 
Given the close connection between land and water rights at the field-level, water 
rights are almost always vested in men, because land, especially in the villages where 
married women live, is generally the land owned by their husband's patrilineage in 
joint or partitioned ownership.30 The land rights-household-inheritance nexus therefore 
also defines her rights to irrigation water. This is the case for women as a member of 
a household in which her father-in-law or her husband is the landowner and the person 
to whom the woman stands in a subordinate position. It also holds for women in the 
position as a temporary or near-permanent head of a household. Whatever rights women 
can claim is claimed on the basis of their derived rights, as a trustee for their sons or 
absent husband. 
The position of married women, however, also varies with the position her husband, 
herself and children - in particular sons - have in the household, i.e., whether the 
household is (still) joint or partitioned. Although the familial relations of authority 
over persons and property are not fully severed, partition removes her somewhat from 
the relations of dominance with her husband's parents and the potential antagonistic 
relationship with her husband's brother(s) and their families. 
Structurally, a married woman is in the most vulnerable position when her husband 
migrates, when he is seriously ill for a longer time, or when he dies. The high rate of 
migration has put the burden of most agricultural work on the shoulders of the women 
staying behind, who have to run their household during their husband's absence. The 
absence of the husband will shift the burden of agriculture entirely to his wife and 
children when they are old enough to work on the land. Ploughing has to be done by 
wage labourers because that is considered men's work (Bruijns and Hijmans 1993: 
43). Due to the high rate of migration in some areas, this affects up to 30% of all 
households (Bruijn and Hijmans 1993). The probability that such a woman will be 
disadvantaged in discussions about the partition of the joint estate is great. She has no 
male support in the negotiations and struggles over the possible partition of the property, 
because her brothers-in-law are her immediate rivals. Her relative strength depends 
29
 Van der Schaaf (this volume) found that in some cases in Rupakot land was indeed registered in a 
wife's name. But the women had no full control over the land. Alienation would not be tolerated 
by her husband's families. 
30
 Gray (1995: 144) calls the right of married women a status-based "right of maintenance from the 
land". 
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also on the sex, number and age of her children. Should she only have daughters, the 
inclination to treat her fairly even by her father-in-law will be minimal, because she 
and her family will not be in the position to continue the patrilineal, and her husband's 
family faces the prospect that the land might be withdrawn from them through alienation 
by the wife or widow, or through the marriage of her daughters to a man of a different 
family. A mother with almost grown-up sons will have a better chance to be treated 
equally, with due respect and will have her land protected by her male in-laws. Much 
also depends on the quality of the relations between the spouses, and the other members 
and in-laws of the family (see van der Schaaf, this volume). 
The extent to which women are dominated and oppressed within the family and 
individual household, however, varies considerably. The most important factors seem 
to be the social class of the household and its caste or ethnic affiliation (Seddon 1987: 
193). There is also variation in women's involvement in subsistence agriculture and 
market oriented economic activities. It is usually high caste women who are under 
greater cultural-religious constraints to engage in other economic activities than 
subsistence agriculture, while women from tribal groups and even more from the 
untouchable jats have more leeway for doing so. On the other hand, given the fact 
that whatever rights in land women hold are derived from their husband or father's 
families, the kind of wealth they control or manage depends on the wealth of these 
families. There is thus a strange contradiction between the cultural-religious-legal 
and actual socio-economic possibilities women have. Wealthier and higher 
caste women are more likely to have the means to purchase land but are heavier 
constrained in engaging in economic activities outside the domestic sphere than low 
caste poor women. 
Irrigation: appropriation and distribution of water 
Apart from such structural legal constraints of acquiring concretised independent 
rights to land and water, women face great difficulties in asserting and effectuating 
their rights, whether independent or derived from their husband's rights. In most 
irrigation systems, women play an active role in the distribution of water and irrigating 
fields.31 Irrigating involves a number of activities such as opening one's own intakes, 
closing others, checking the amount of water in the field, and guarding one's own 
intake. Women's problems in actually getting water on their (husband's) fields vary 
with the seasonal relative scarcity of water, the organization of water distribution, and 
the location of the land. In principle during periods of water abundance, when no 
farmer has to wait until another has taken his or her turn, women and men alike have 
no problems getting sufficient irrigation water. The problems come with scarcity. 
Water distribution is particularly problematic for women who have no husband 
around, if distribution systems are less clear ór where there is no strong, well functioning 
distribution officer. This is the case, for example, when there is only just sufficient 
water, but not for all interested farmers at the same time. For reasons of water efficiency 
31
 See Seddon 1987: 193, B. Pradhan 1983, N.C. Pradhan 1989. In some regions, women do not 
irrigate khet land, see Prabina Bajracharya in this volume. 
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it may make sense to introduce an on-demand rotational system in which farmers 
demand water whenever and how much they want. Under this type of distribution 
farmers repeatedly have to negotiate turns and quantities; they also have to check 
closely whether the other farmers respect their turn. Often when they have opened 
their intake and return later to check, they find that somebody has closed it again. 
Such a distribution system therefore is rather unpredictable and susceptible to 
manipulation and power differentials. Under these conditions lower status, people 
from lower caste and especially women without a husband have a difficult-time to get 
sufficient quantities of water at the right time. High class elite farmers may bluff their 
way in demanding more water at the most convenient time. Such a system potentially 
draws participants into bothersome quarrels over the distribution with others, an activity 
considered inappropriate especially for high caste women. The scarcer the available 
water is, the more problematic on-demand rotation becomes. For women these 
negotiations and quarrels with male and sometimes higher caste farmers are particularly 
bothersome. Women therefore prefer scheduled rotation schemes that guarantee some 
predictability (Bruijns and Hijmans 1993: 31). 
When water is scarce, conflicts over water are common. During the peak-demand 
for water, when ploughing and transplanting rice in the monsoon there is severe 
competition among farmers to get a turn. Women have difficulties obtaining water 
under these conditions, and often only get water after male farmers have finished 
their irrigation (N. Pradhan 1989: 53). Moreover, it is considered to be inappropriate 
for women to go to the fields at night. This means in effect that they are unable to use 
their legitimate night turn, let alone engage in 'water stealing' and other ways of 
manipulating water distribution at night. 
If water distribution is performed and monitored by specially appointed 
functionaries (panipale), the conditions for women improve. A strong and incorruptible 
functionary is especially beneficial for women. Problems and infringements of rotation 
rights may be reported to him and he also takes care of sanctioning. N. Pradhan 
reports that where there is a good organization of water distribution in place, women 
can take part in the distribution schedule as well as men. In some districts, women are 
even involved in irrigation during night hours, if the land is close to their residence. If 
their land is more distant, being out in the fields is risky and dangerous and nightly 
rotation turns cannot be used; going out at night is also disapproved on cultural 
grounds.32 In that case women have to rely on their male in-laws for protection and . 
this is not always a reliable source for protection." 
n
 See N. Pradhan 1989: 53. Van der Schaaf (this volume) reports that in Rupakot, Tanahun district, 
the situation for women became much easier when the distribution official took over distribution. 
" There is also some evidence that contradicts this. Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen (1998: 183) 
report that women who are not a member of a water user association profit from their liberty by 
taking water whenever they need it, without bothering about the distribution schemes that have 
been made by an institution in which they do take part. The association has great difficulties to 
bring them under control, because they have no way of sanctioning the women. On the other 
hand, the authors also point out that such access, that is not based on formal legal rules and 
sanctions, is not secure and more subject to unequal power relations than control over water based 
on democratically devised rules and principles (1998: 185). It is clear that this issue deserves 
further investigation. 
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Distribution control and decision making 
While decisions concerning land, crop choice and the distribution of profit may be 
taken jointly by men and women, husbands and wives, female household heads and 
their husband's in-laws, women are largely excluded from decisions over the control 
and distribution of irrigation water. The reason is that these decision making processes 
are not made at the household level, but in communal forums and organizations. And 
these are very much the world of men. Depending on the organization of water control, 
the right to decide lies in the hand of powerful individuals or families, in informal 
meetings, or in meetings of a water users committee or association, where elite members 
often informally are in control. 
Distribution schedules and the division of water between major and minor irrigation 
canals are often contested, especially when the organization is weak and control poor. 
The version that 'sticks' is largely dominated by the more powerful men, high caste 
farmers, and often headend farmers. Distribution of rotation shares and day and night 
turns therefore often constitute unequal systems in which some persons, notably of 
low caste, low status persons and widows, have to take their turn at inconvenient 
times, e.g., during the night or at the end of the planting cycle. Influential people 
often have the most convenient position within the rotation cycle. In conflicts about 
the division of water over and about distribution schedules, caste and wealth differences 
as well as political connections play a major role. They take place in communal and 
public arenas in which women do not usually want, or are expected to act. 
Not all irrigation systems have official institutions in which decisions about the 
distribution, management and operation are made. Some small farmer managed systems 
have virtually no formal institutions. But where water management institutions have 
been established, they are invariably highly gendered. Outside agencies who build or 
rehabilitate irrigation systems require that users committees or associations be set up, 
with one or two female members. But the women who are appointed or selected are 
often taken from the wealthier high caste households; literacy or even Nepali 
citizenship14 may be required. The life experience of these women is so different 
from that of female heads of households or low caste and low class women, that they 
cannot adequately represent these women in their irrigation system. Many women 
express the feeling that they would not be taken seriously by men; also, that it would 
be inappropriate for them to speak in public.35 Whatever influence women exert on 
public decision making is predominantly done within the domestic sphere. 
34
 Nepali citizenship is a politically highly sensitive issue in the southern and eastern regions of 
Nepal with open borders to India. Poor people, especially women, lack the financial and social 
resources necessary to obtain formal citizenship. Therefore, they often cannot be members of 
registered associations. See van der Schaaf in this volume. 
,5
 See Bruijns and Hijmans 1993. See also the contributions of Bajracharya and van der Schaaf in 
this volume. However, examples from the IWMI gender, poverty and water research in West 
Gandak and Andhi Khola suggest that some Water User Associations do have active female members 
who do speak up in public (personal communication Prabina Bajracharya, Amita Tuladhar and 
Shuku Pun). 
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Since rights to water are so strongly contingent on negotiating, decision making or 
struggle, women are in a weaker position than men to effectuate whatever water rights 
for irrigation. Women in particular have specific interests in the availability of water 
for domestic uses, for laundry, kitchen gardens, livestock and fodder production 
(see Jackson 1998: 35). Water for these purposes is often drawn from main or branch 
canals, but women are more or less fully excluded from decision making processes-
about the intake and the allocation of water between main or secondary canals. 
Discussions and decisions in such committees tend to focus on the distribution of 
water for irrigation. Other uses of water are by and large ignored. In practice this 
means that there is no water in the canals during the period in which irrigation water 
is not needed. Women have to use other water sources for domestic purposes 
during this time, which are often further away from their homes. Thus, exclusion of 
women from the decision making bodies has further reaching consequences than for 
irrigation only.16 
Maintenance 
In order to maintain one's (household's) rights one must fulfil one's obligation to 
contribute to repair and maintenance of the irrigation system. The yearly maintenance 
work is done by labour and financial inputs of the water users themselves." 
Participation in maintenance establishes and confirms rights to water." Maintenance 
work is in principle considered a male domain, but there is considerable variation. 
The willingness and possibilities of women to contribute to the maintenance strongly 
depends on their economic status and their household composition and social network. 
Also the extent to which women, especially those who are temporarily or permanently 
head of their households, have to and actually do participate in order to maintain their 
household's rights, varies. 
Most women are reluctant to work on the main and branch canals, especially in 
the larger systems, because they lack the time. However, women usually contribute to 
the maintenance of field channels. They also contribute to the total labour input by 
providing snacks and food - an activity which often goes unnoticed because it is seen 
as belonging to the domestic sphere rather than to canal maintenance (N. Pradhan 
1989:53). 
In most systems, whenever a contribution is required in cash or labour, households 
headed by women contribute equally to households headed by men (N. Pradhan 1989: 
w
 See van Koppen 1998b on inclusion and exclusion. 
" The amount of work may be equally divided among the households of the users. Other ways to 
divide the work is on the basis of size of land or on the basis of water shares, or on the basis of one 
share for each hamlet. Financial inputs are usually raised by the users. If the government has made 
permanent structures, financial demands for maintenance are relatively low and labour is recruited 
from among the users. However, the costs of repair after floods or landslides may be far too high 
for the users. Nowadays, the government often pays at least a substantial part of the repairs. 
•
1S
 Because of that, persons who are not granted full rights usually may not participate in regular 
maintenance work, but they can be called upon for emergency repairs. Emergency repair does not 
establish rights to water. 
/ 
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52). When they are unable to participate in the repair and maintenance work, they 
often have to send male family members or hired and paid labourers. Women with a 
large family and good social relations can use more family labour. Better-off women 
who are able to produce a surplus can use this for hiring labourers. It seems that in 
some areas and under certain conditions, female heads of households do not participate 
in the maintenance at all, without loosing their water rights.39 Poor women both lack 
the necessary time and labour (Cleaver 1998: 60). As a result, they may loose their 
potential rights to irrigation water and as a consequence be unable to work their land.40 
As in the case of working and irrigating fields, there are differences in maintenance 
work according to the caste status of women and the location of the land. High caste 
women seem to do less maintenance work. N. Pradhan (1989) reports that in the hills 
women are prohibited from working in repair and maintenance activities of the larger 
canals. Such work is seen as 'men's' work. Often, women are described by men, but 
also by women, as being physically incapable of doing hard physical work.41 Women 
from tribal groups and even more from the untouchableyate have a larger recognized 
room for engaging in maintenance work, and therefore have better opportunities to 
maintain their rights to water, however small the amount of water may be. 
Thus, in two main parts of the total complex of water rights, women are either totally 
excluded or severely limited. This goes for participation in negotiating and deciding 
on rules of distribution and in maintenance work. Moreover, because of the marriage 
and inheritance rules they usually have only derived rights to water at best. And these 
rights cannot be easily effectuated without strong close male relatives or a well-
functioning panipale in place.42 
Conclusions 
In this contribution we have outlined the major contingencies of gendered water rights 
in farmer managed irrigation systems in Nepal: The problem of converting categorical 
rights into concretised rights; the dependence of women's concretised water rights on 
land rights held by men; the problems women face in the actual appropriation of 
water, and their virtual exclusion from decision making processes over the distribution 
of irrigation water and over the use of water in irrigation canals and the organization 
of maintenance work. The latter aspect is particularly important given the highly 
dynamic and frequent changes in the water rights system due to changes in local 
political organization and the hydrological and technological structures of the irrigation 
w
 Prabina Bajracharya (this volume) reports this from a hamlet in Ham district that female headed 
households get exemption from labour contribution. See also van der Schaaf in this volume. 
40
 See Pun in this volume. 
41
 See Bajracharya in this volume. She reports that, in contrast to what men say about their physical 
capabilities, women complain that they are not given the opportunity because they are not called 
to do maintenance work. 
42
 But see Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 1998: 193. 
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systems. Women thus generally have little opportunities to acquire concretised rights 
and have little influence on the specification of the amounts of water, while they find 
it very difficult to maintain their rights and defend whatever rights they have. 
Our account also shows that women never function as holders of land and water 
rights just as 'women'. Their legal and social position on which they claim rights or 
enter into negotiations is always a compound of status elements. Some of these elements 
derive from their individual relationship to their father's and their husband's family. 
Some are general, derived from their caste and class status. In any negotiation or 
struggle over water, they enter as a Chhetri or low caste women; as a married women 
or as a widow; as a member or a head of a household; claiming water for alchet or bari 
field in the tail- or headend of the irrigation system; in the old or newly expanded 
command area of an irrigation system. Women thus are simultaneously constrained 
by all these positional characteristics. 
This means that gender cannot easily be isolated from these other social 
differentials. Changes directed at gender relationships, for instance claims to gender 
equality, affect all other categories. Political calls for gender equality are often directed 
at the socially 'naked' individual, abstract from his or her other social and economic 
characteristics such as caste and class. But since gender does not exist in isolation, 
questioning the legitimacy of gender inequality is likely to affect also the legitimation 
of other inequalities. This may be even more the case because of all categorical 
inequalities, gender is perceived as the most 'natural' biological inequality, although 
caste inequality is also based upon physio-moral categorical differences.43 In political 
and academic debates, there is a tendency to focus too strongly on gender and on 
individualized property rights in isolation, paying too little attention to the multiple 
status and relational elements in which female - and male - persons are enmeshed and 
to the multiple contingencies of water rights.44 Providing women with the same rights 
as men would mean something different according to status, caste and wealth. 
How does this relate to the statement of Zwarteveen (1997: 1346) that "the biggest 
impediment to establishing legitimacy for women's need for individual water rights is 
the astounding lack of recognition of women as irrigators and water users"? We doubt 
whether a greater visibility and recognition of women's important role in irrigated 
agriculture, and as irrigators, as such would lead to much change. It depends more on 
the legal and social organization and rules that structure the ways in which labour is 
controlled and attributed through status and contractual obligations. Male wage 
ty
 But unlike caste, gender, in Tilly's words (1998: 75), is an exterior category to the household or 
village organization that is 'matched' within the organisation of households and villages and 
becomes an interior category as well. As Tilly (1998: 77) points out, this reinforces inequality 
considerably. 
44
 Even Zwarte veen ( 1997) in her excellent paper on gender and water rights in the context of irrigation, 
too generally speaks of 'women', and the attribution of water rights to 'men', and does not discuss 
the relation of water rights to land rights. While she convincingly points out that in relation to 
men, women are disadvantaged in that they a) have less water rights, and hardly ever on an individual 
basis, and b) even where women have such rights or act as trustees for their adolescent sons or 
absent husbands, she fails to come back to the land right-water right nexus and women's position 
in the household relationship complex. 
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labourers, share-croppers or bonded labourers perform most of the agricultural work 
and canal construction and maintenance, yet it is usually attributed to those persons 
or institutions who control this labour. Their activities and labour inputs in irrigation 
remain legally irrelevant in the sense that such labour does not lead to new property 
rights to land and water. Likewise, the work of women in irrigation is attributed to 
their husband or the household, but not to them personally. But we have to keep in 
mind that within the household, many men do not have individual rights to land or 
water either. Most agricultural land is inherited property which is not at free disposal 
to a man. Partitioning often takes place long after a man has established his own 
family. But even after partitioning has taken place, the land is not fully at his disposal. 
However, their labour is put on their own account and at least men have the expectation 
that after partition they become full title holders. 
This also shows that providing women with individual rights to land and water 
would require far more than simply passing a law to allow women to have individual 
rights to water. Scepticism towards the presumed security that new formal rights 
allegedly bring is certainly warranted, given the experiences governments all over the 
world have had in using legal engineering as an instrument to change social and 
economic conditions.45 The introduction of categorical rights for 'women' will not 
automatically lead to women acquiring concretised rights. Individual concretised rights 
to land and water, even if they could not easily be effectuated, may give women a 
better bargaining position in relation with their husbands and family-in-law. But to 
bring women into a more equal position with men would require changing the whole 
structure of categorical rights as well as a fundamental change of the conditions under 
which women can acquire and maintain over time concretised independent rights to 
land and water. In other words, it would require a rearrangement of the many-stranded 
household relations and their marital and matrimonial property relations. Given the 
gender inequalities in culture and religion, it would also require a fundamental change 
in the worldview of men and women.46 Unless the whole land and water rights system 
would be changed, women would need land rights from which their water rights can 
be derived. Dissociating rights to irrigation water completely from rights to land would 
be very difficult in the existing systems. And if it would be possible it would bring 
only temporary relief at best. In order to maintain such rights to water through time 
and over the death of an individual woman, the inheritance system would have to be 
changed as well. 
But given the particular ways in which rights to water are simultaneously but 
flexibly connected to land rights and socio-political decision making over water, even 
if changes in the private law sphere would occur, this would not provide a solution to 
another set of severe problems that have come out of the Nepalese material: it would 
not necessarily mean that they would get more influence in decision making processes 
45
 See Cleaver ( 1998: 47, 55) for a critique on the assumption that formal rights, i.e., rights based on 
the national legal system, are "more robust and enduring than informal ones." For a more general 
discussion of legal engineering policies, see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1989, Rose 1998. 
46
 See the conditions in Rupakot described by van der Schaaf in this volume. 
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in Water Users Associations. For this, other, cultural-religious and economic factors 
that shape women's actual positions and relationships would have to change too. 
Finally, individual rights would not necessarily give women a better position in 
defending their water rights in case there is no husband around, due to death, sickness, 
or migration. We have seen that because of the specific characteristics of water, 
defending one's right needs to be done at a particular moment. If one is too late, the 
water will have gone. Women have more difficulties than men to do so, although 
there are also examples of women who freely steal water because they cannot be 
controlled by the very organization that excludes them from participation.47 In their 
relations and interactions with men in other households and in community institutions 
other cultural-religious and economic (time and labour) constraints inhibit women 
from actively and if necessary aggressively defending their water turns when fields 
are irrigated, no matter what kind of right to water they hold. 
Does this all mean that one should refrain from attempts to improve the situation 
of women regarding water rights? Certainly not, but the analysis calls for modesty in 
one's aspirations. Water rights relate to many widely diverse issues, in part of high 
economic and political sensitivity. The path to improvement is therefore complex, 
difficult and long. 
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